​The Shape of Tomorrow
 
On Friday, October 6th the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that the International Campaign to abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has been awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, “The organization is receiving the award for its work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its groundbreaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons,” the Norwegian Nobel Committee said in a statement.  Indeed, perhaps at no time since the unstable 1950s has the world been closer to nuclear war.  Over the past few weeks the rhetoric has increased between Trump who threatened to “totally destroy North Korea” and referred to President Kim as “little rocket man” and Kim Jong Un who, in turn, said, “I will surely and definitely tame the mentally deranged U.S. dotard with fire.”  North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Yong Ho on September 25th proclaimed that Donald Trump had declared war on North Korea when Trump tweeted that North Korea won’t be around much longer. 
            What are we to make of these exchanges in which both leaders call the other madmen and threaten military action against the other that sounds as if it’s consistent with pre-emptive attacks by either side? And the attacks sound like nuclear attacks as per Trump’s declaration when he threatened to unleash “fire and fury like the world has never seen.” How are people to understand such rhetoric? 
            It is against this backdrop that ICAN has been working to press for support of the disarmament treaty that they negotiated in July.  Those negotiations were boycotted by the nine nuclear nations (the U.S., Russia, China, North Korea, Britain, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel) and their allies.  However, there was participation by two-thirds of the U.N.’s member nations and 53 countries have signed on.  This is a show of international anxiety about the current instability of the nuclear threat.
            The instability of the 1950s led to a mutual strategy between the U.S.A. and the USSR called MAD (or mutually assured destruction).  Both countries had the largest stockpiles of weapons that were deployed in various regions so that they might respond to an offensive attack by the other party.  On top of this informal strategy were the various bi-lateral treaties to limit the stockpiles of the two nations and the multi-national Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.  Though the tensions were high, there was a general confidence that neither side wanted a nuclear war.  It was an unthinkable outcome to be avoided at all costs.
            Today, the world does not have such confidence when we bring in the leaders of the U.S.A. and North Korea.  At this writing it seems improbable that North Korea could render a single nuclear weapon against the United States, much less a destructive event envisioned by MAD.  However they could reach Seoul, (population of 10 million/ metropolitan area population of 25 million).  They may be able to hit targets in Japan, as well.  This would amount to an enormous bloodbath.  Thus, launching a nuclear or even a conventional attack against North Korea might have some severe consequences. 
Is this a sable situation similar to what we possessed under MAD?  There is no way to know for sure.  It depends upon the leader of North Korea understanding that he is NOT under attack and that all pressure to be applied will be economic and political.  Does Kim Jong Un understand this?  It depends upon who you ask.  Prior to January 20, 2017 the answer was, “yes.”  After this date the game changed to one of bluffing—aka “chicken.”  The rules of this game require that each party (Trump and Kim) believes that the other may actually commit a military act to gain advantage—even though that game scenario has cataclysmic negative outcomes from both directions.  Thus, one would have to say that each leader is either bluffing for some sort of posturing effect or that one or both is stupid or mentally unfit.  Various outside commentators have made assessments about the capacities of the leaders, but thankfully, neither country is totally dependent upon the man at the top, alone.
Kim has a circle of advisors and so does Trump.  How much sway do these advisors have?  In the United States we have Mattis and Tillerson (who has recently claimed to have forged a direct contact with North Korea—though Trump rebuked him for that remark).  Both Mattis and Tillerson have shown themselves to have the capacity of independence as evidenced by their comments when the President spoke out about the Charlottesville unrest. 
It should be noted that un-written protocol for the President to have the power to launch a nuclear attack goes back to Truman who ordered the only two atomic attacks in history.  However, there is precedent for disobeying orders in the military.  Anyone in the Army, for example, may disobey a command when that command directly contradicts the Army Code of Conduct.  This might create the groundwork for Mattis and/or Tillerson disobeying/interfering with a Presidential order to mount a nuclear attack against North Korea in response to a North Korean nuclear weapons test, for example.  They could claim that such a response fails the proportionality provision of the rules of war to which the United States is a signatory.
Will these advisers have the independence to disobey an order to initiate a nuclear or conventional attack—when either scenario has a cataclysmic negative outcome?  Time will tell.  But a possible bright spot is the planned China trip by Trump in November with Chinese President Xi Jinping.  Certainly it would seem that this would discount military action against North Korea before then (unless it’s all a ruse). 
The stakes are certainly high.  Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director of ICAN responded to the Trump-Kim exchanges this way, “Nuclear weapons do not bring stability and security. . . We can see that right now.” Diplomacy is our only hope.  Let’s pray that those around Trump and Kim can make the difference and save the world.
 
Michael Boylan is Professor of Philosophy at Marymount University.  He has held positions at the Center for American Progress and the Brookings Institution and has served on federal government committees.  His most recent books are: Natural Human Rights: A Theory (political philosophy), Teaching Ethics with Three Philosophical Novels (pedagogy), and Georgia: A Trilogy (philosophical novels).
 
 

​Will We Go to War with North Korea?
 
 
Over the past few weeks the rhetoric has increased between Trump who threatened to “totally destroy North Korea” and referred to President Kim as “rocket man” and Kim Jong Un who, in turn, said, “I will surely and definitely tame the mentally deranged U.S. dotard with fire.”  North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Yong Ho on September 25th declared that Donald Trump had declared war on North Korea when he tweeted that North Korea won’t be around much longer. 
            What are we to make of these exchanges in which both leaders call the other madmen and threaten military action against the other that sounds as if it’s consistent with pre-emptive attacks by either side. And the attacks sound like nuclear attacks as per Trump’s declaration when he threatened to unleash “fire and fury like the world has never seen.” How are people to understand such rhetoric? 
            One way to think about this is via game theory.  In game theory one tries to attach values upon different courses of action and then assess the outcome that has the highest benefit.  Whenever one result is so cataclysmic that it dwarfs all other expected values, then it achieves the probability status of dominance. Whenever, within a range of probabilities, there is one outcome that is dominant, then this fact dwarfs the other expected outcomes and becomes the focus of attention. In the past, such a game scenario created the so-called MAD (or mutually assured destruction) strategy for any war between the USSR and the United States.  Both countries had the largest stockpiles of weapons that were deployed in various regions so that they might respond to an offensive attack by the other party.  This game used very high levels of destruction of both sides to create an unacceptable outcome for both parties (i.e., dominance).  Therefore, an acceptable stalemate was achieved that was stable save for an accidental freak event—such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.
            With North Korea the power balance is different.  At this writing it seems improbable that North Korea could render a single nuclear weapon against the United States, much less a destructive event envisioned by MAD.  However they could reach Seoul, (population of 10 million/ metropolitan area population of 25 million).  They may be able to hit targets in Japan, as well.  This would amount to an enormous bloodbath.  Thus, launching a nuclear or even a conventional attack against North Korea might have some severe consequences. 
Recently, I had a conversation with a retired army general about the game outcomes of a surprise conventional attack against North Korean nuclear facilities with the goal of taking out North Korean nuclear capacity all together.  He said that the critical game condition would be our intelligence about where all the missile launchers are as well as their stockpile of warheads.  Even if we had perfect information (unlikely), there would still be a conventional response against South Korea and a resumption of the Korean War.  North Korea continues to maintain an army of around a million.  It is one of the largest standing armies in the world.  This would certainly be a negative expected value of such a high degree that dominance would be exhibited against the scenario.   
As a result it seems that there are no good game scenarios in which a positive expected value might be achieved through the use of military force against North Korea.  In each case, dominance exerts itself through the unacceptably high negative outcomes.  Thus, it would seem that only diplomatic options should be employed.  In the diplomatic game some kind of common ground is thought to be a necessary starting point.  Before January 20, 2017 the game played out like this: 1. The United States, along with the world community (through the United Nations), in return for real diplomatic negotiations about North Korea’s nuclear stance would offer the positive possibility of economic interchange that would boost prosperity for the people of North Korea and, by extension, enhance the popularity of the country’s leader.  2. North Korea would often agree, and even sign documents, but would later renege and adopt bellicose language and continue on its nuclear program.  3. Countries around the world, including to a lesser degree China, would put economic sanctions on North Korea.  4.  North Korea would yell louder and the rest of the world would pretend that they didn’t hear—and then loop back to #1.  This cyclic diplomatic game would repeat over and over while North Korea continued to develop better ballistic missiles and more powerful and compact nuclear weapons.  Is this a sable game?  There is no way to know for sure.  It depends upon the leader of North Korea understanding that he is NOT under attack and that all pressure to be applied will be economic and political.  Does Kim Jong Un understand this?  It depends upon who you ask.  Prior to January 20, 2017 the answer was, “yes.”  After this date the game changed to one of bluffing—aka “chicken.”  The rules of this game require that each party (Trump and Kim) believes that the other may actually commit a military act to gain advantage—even though that game scenario has dominant negative outcomes from both directions.  Thus, one would have to say that each leader is either bluffing for some sort of posturing effect or that one or both is stupid or mentally unfit.  Various outside commentators have made assessments about the capacities of the leaders, but thankfully, neither country is totally dependent upon the man at the top, alone.
Kim has a circle of advisors and so does Trump.  How much sway do these advisors have?  In the United States we have Mattis and Tillerson (who has recently claimed to have forged a direct contact).  Both Mattis and Tillerson have shown themselves to have the capacity of independence when the President spoke out about the Charlottesville unrest.  Will they have the independence to disobey an order to initiate a nuclear or conventional attack—when either scenario has a dominant negative outcome?  Time will tell.  But a possible bright spot is the planned China trip by Trump in November with Chinese President Xi Jinping.  Certainly it would seem that this would discount military action in Korea before then (unless it’s all a ruse). 
Since I am, by nature, a hopeful fellow, my crystal ball suggests that instead of military action, we will move into a new version of Diplomacy (Diplomacy 2.0) which will have its own game rules built upon a more successful array of economic and political pressures and incentives for North Korea to re-enter the community of nations.  A lot will ride on this game.
 
Michael Boylan is Professor of Philosophy at Marymount University.  He has held positions at the Center for American Progress and the Brookings Institution and has served on government committees.  His most recent books are: Natural Human Rights: A Theory (political philosophy), Teaching Ethics with Three Philosophical Novels (pedagogy), and Georgia: A Trilogy (philosophical novels).
 
 

​Hiking the Appalachian Trail with Mark Sanford
 
We have a few causal (non-casual) issues to think about.  They are all related, but my order of presentation will be rather skewed.  First of all, I recently heard (MSBC 11-5-15: 7:45 pm) Mark Sanford who is the former governor of South Carolina and is now a representative in Congress for the 1st Congressional District discussing what to with the Guantanamo Jail in Cuba.  Roughly 112 of the original 780 prisoners are still left in custody.  None have been charged with a civil or a war crime.  What should we do with them?  Mark Sanford suggested that we take them “out back” in the Southern tradition (according to Sanford) and “put a bullet in their heads.”
Now maybe it’s because I’m working on a BIG book on Southern justice in the United States between 1870-1930 that this response is so troublesome to me. 
This is no joke or light hearted matter.
But it causes me to pivot to other non-jokes.  What comes to mind is the fate of Richard A. Clarke and the anti-terrorism team that he assembled for the Clinton Administration in scare of the turning of the millennium, 2000.  This was a very competent, dream team.  Clarke had cabinet level status, but he came from the other side.  George W. Bush dismantled the team and demoted Clarke (who warned about terrorism threats and whose efforts generated the August 2000 memo that there would be a terrorism attempt in September, 2001 originating from a northeast airport). 
This constitutes a policy decision by George W. Bush for which he is responsible.
George W. Bush had empowered Condoleezza Rice, an expert on the Soviet Union (pre-Russian Federation politics, 1990 and before).  Unfortunately, this skill set was not current to 2001—even though she fit the preferred political profile more than Mr. Clarke.  With respect to Mid-East terrorism, she was not knowledgeable. This constitutes a policy decision by George W. Bush for which he is responsible.    
Thus, when there was a terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 the George W. Bush administration was content with reading with children a book, “My Pet Goat.”  His mea culpa was, “How could anyone know this might happen?”  “Why do they hate us?”  And then he launched two wars.  The first: Afghanistan was unnecessary.  The reason for this assessment comes from a briefing I was privy to when I was a fellow at the Center for American Progress.  After the 9-11 attack the leader of Afghanistan, Mullah Omar, offered to bring Osama bin Laden to trial according to Islamic law (with the hint that Osama might be beheaded by Muslims in front of an international audience).  This information, to my understanding was not released generally to the American public. If we had accepted the offer, the role of the United States would be far different today.
 The second: to topple Sadam Hussein because he had weapons of mass destruction that he would use against the United States.  This was a spurious claim.  It was being disproven by Hans Glick in his incomplete U.N. report that detailed his search which had found nothing of the sort.  The reason the report was incomplete was because Bush did not let him complete it.  Bush was told by God to invade Iraq and dispose its dictator.  Okay.  Back to the beginning and Afghanistan and their offer to bring Ossama bin Laden to justice.    
But what might this offer mean? 
On one level, we could have had Osama bin Laden “tried and convicted” by his cohort group.  If he had been killed as the result it would have been Muslim justice in the international sphere.  If that had happened, then the colonial intervention that ensued would not have happened.  There would be no abiding anger against the United States.  So why didn’t we go that route?  Because we wanted to be the big dog on the block so that we might get respect for our power. But we philosophers generally accept from Republic I of Plato the five arguments that reject the “might makes right” claim by Thrasymachus (cf. Gorgias). 
So does causation theory have anything to say on this?  Thomas sets out a theory of public causation that says whoever alters the normal (natural) course of affairs is responsible for the consequences.  Others have suggested the trigger theory in which the proximate agent in the event chant is responsible.  Donald Davidson liked this approach, though it has serious counter-examples.  Finally, there is the theory set out by Hart and Honoré in Causation and the Law that creates a joint and several causation theory.  I believe all three are correct within certain restricted contexts. 
So how are we to get beyond this philosophical baggage and judge how we might close Guantanamo Bay prison?  How long must a mistake endure?  George Herbert Walker Bush in his forthcoming book (as told to his ghost writer) suggested that since his son’s freewill was compromised by Cheney and Rumsfeld that he should be seen as a neutral actor in the scene.  Well, since these folks are walking on the Appalachian Trail with others keen on re-writing history in their own favor (sometimes known as “spinning”), we should beg off and take out our inflatable life raft and go down another route towards the port of truth. 
Is it better than becoming a “sell-out” for partial truths, partial lies which constitutes much of what we call current political discourse?  Here I side with William Kingdom Clifford and my friend the late Roderick M. Chisholm who held there was a moral responsibility to exercise due diligence in the pursuit of truth.  To do otherwise is to deny out rational nature.  This is unethical.
 
Michael Boylan
11-10-15
 

​Is Money the Root of All Evil?
 
It is a common maxim that money is the root of all evil.  This seems to put the causal agent for evil on the exchange medium used to enable developed economies to leave barter (an earlier form of goods exchange).  I will argue that this common maxim is wrong on two fronts.  The first and most important error this common maxim makes is that it is not money (which is merely a vehicle of goods exchange) but rather the desire for money that is at fault.  In the children’s story “The Fisherman and his Wife” desire for material goods is shown to increase even as each wish is granted.  Desire feeds further desire.  This, of course, is the central tenet of Buddhism.  In my 2007 novel, The Extinction of Desire, it was shown that monetary windfalls are not necessarily good.  They are bad if they incite greater desire.  Thus, it is not money, per se, that is bad but the desire that is kindled for more and more that is evil.  It is evil because people infuse actual value into the money and material goods when they do not possess any intrinsic value.  Thus the person who is caught in this spiral makes a category mistake: he or she believes that they possess something of ultimate worth when they only possess a material transaction device.  Since the most important goods in life: love, friendship, kindness and charity are not material, a flaw exists in the materialists’ logic.
Money by itself is thus a neutral institutional device that is more efficient than barter for economic transfers.  Too much desire can create a logical error that can confuse the agent into infusing real value into something without any (but expedient value as an economic tool).  This mistake can turn its adherents toward a series of errors in the direction of life.  These errors can cause the materialist true believer into bad (evil) actions.  But it is the desire and the illogic that can follow from it that is the real culprit.
A better candidate for “all evil” might be the illusion that those successful Mammon-following candidates might hold as a personal worldview: I am so powerful with my accumulation of money that I am The Master of the Universe.  This is the sin of ultimate pride—assuming that you are god-like in your power.  It leads to many subsequent errors in judgment which, in turn, lead to bad (evil) actions.  Again, it is not the money, as such, but how one’s attitude about the money that leads people astray.  In this case it is the acquisition of power (cf. Tolkein’s Lord of the Rings) that causes the acquisition of false attitudes that lead to one’s downfall. 
Money is not the root of all evil.  Rather it is our attitudes about money that allow it to corrupt the human spirit.
Michael Boylan, Professor of Philosophy, Marymount University.

Georgia--A Trilogy: Part Two is the third book within inte Arche series of books that explore the major structural approaches of the novel.  This book, like Georgia--A Trilogy: Part One intends to be philosophy in the form of fiction.  This is done through character, plot and the 12 book epic structure (each book has twelve chapters).  Beginning each of the 12 books is an essay on narrative art and then some exhibits that situate the chapters in the book to the English litarary tradition and to African American literature.  All exist together, like the philosopher's stone, so that alchemy might result and turn the reading experience into gold.

​Readers are encouraged to post their thoughts here or on other blogs--such as Amazon or Goodreads.  

 From September 20 to October 20, 2016 Georgia: A Trilogy--Part One will be on a blog tour.  Catch up with the Blog Tour by entering Michael Boylan and the book title into your search engine.  Then read the various comments people make about the book.  Of course, if you want to make up your own mind, buy the book and write your own comments.  I hope you do enjoy the book.  It's been 42 years in the making and over 30 complete drafts.  

Michael Boylan’s Archē Series
(The Archē Series seeks to explore philosophical themes within the context of varying novelistic structures that endeavors to define some of the major directions of that fiction form.)
 
Naked Reverse. (January, 2016)
There’s a secret back door to the Ivory Tower.  Follow college professor Andrew Viam through that secret passageway as he goes on an Odyssey into the real world full of love and violence.  Will he survive?  This is an open question.  He falls for a woman, but then she’s running away from a boyfriend who’s into Organized Crime and wants her back.  From the tough city streets of Chicago to the wild woods of Wisconsin, Andrew will have to call on new resources if he wants to make it alive to next term.  It’s a summer break he’d never experienced—and hopefully never will again. The presentation mode is conventional time sequence narrative.  The overarching philosophical position is achieving personal authenticity via action consistent with the personal worldview imperative.
ISBN 978-1-5137-06726
 
Georgia (in three parts, 2016-2017)
What does the novel look like as epic?  Georgia uses this structural device to explore racial identity in the state of Georgia between 1900-1930.  John Dow, is an orphan of unknown parentage who is discovered by a wealthy farmer, Samuel Beauchay, who operates what used to be a cotton plantation that used slave labor.  The farmer raises Dow almost as if he were his own son.  The problem for John and those around him during his upbringing of privilege is whether he is black. Racial identity was very important in the rural town of Varner’s Junction.  John’s real upbringing comes at the hand of Jefferson John Brown who is one of the first African Americans to receive a degree in philosophy at an Ivy League University.  A series of disasters brings Jefferson back to Varner’s Junction where he had been born.  He now runs Samuel Beauchay’s farm for him.  A murder, a fugitive, threats of lynching create a fast pace against the back drop of the decay of the Old South.  Join along to be a partner in history and discover who-done-it! The presentation mode contains the machinery of the epic as developed in the Western Tradition.  The overarching philosophical position concerns the search for personal identity, race, and the shared community worldview of an unstable racist society.
 
T-Rx: The History of a Radical Leader (2018)
During the late 1960s there was a feeling among some young people that the United States was on the verge of a revolution.  The Vietnam War, Civil Rights, new social mores all contributed to a situation in which a counter-culture evolved.  This book explores the story of one counter-culture group led by a man who called himself, T-Rx.  Enter into this world of those who seek to turn the world upside down.  Watch as the FBI tries to stop them.  How far can revolution go?  Is it ever a good thing?  Wasn’t the United States founded upon revolution? The presentation mode is epistolary.  The overarching philosophical position concerns the parallel positions of the extent of individual liberty within an established democratic society and an examination of consent respecting the existing legal system.
 
The Long Fall of the Ball from the Wall (2019)
Human history in the West is sometimes parsed via the Enlightenment as offering an individualistic perspective that countered the existing communitarian worldview.  I have examined this historical change via direct discourse in chapters 2 & 3 of Natural Human Rights: A Theory (Cambridge, 2014).  As fictive narrative philosophy this theoretical construct is examined in term of the early 1960s through the assassination of John F. Kennedy.  This novel examines a hypothetical 2nd gunman behind the grassy knoll and how his personal struggles mirror the larger themes of individual liberty and perceived government/social oppression.  The novel is told via the presentation mode of discontinuous narrative. The overarching philosophical position concerns the dialectical interactions between the role of a given individual and the society at large.  How do these interactions affect free will and determinism?
 

Booktrope published my new novel Naked Reverse